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FAIRNESS BEYOND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM:  
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE NORMS 
FOR LEGAL NEGOTIATION 
Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff* 
INTRODUCTION 
The tale of the vanishing trial is, by now, familiar and well worn.1  The arc 
and import of the narrative differ by teller:  some decry the loss of an 
adjudicated outcome, either by judge or by jury,2 and some praise the 
proliferation of alternative methods for dispute resolution that might allow 
for more flexibility and efficiency.3  Either way, the decline in trials and 
adjudicated outcomes raises critical questions about the nature of the 
adversary system.  The decline in trials has raised particular concerns in the 
criminal context, where “negotiated justice” has drawn a phalanx of critics.4  
Plea bargaining is susceptible to a negotiation analysis,5 and understanding 
plea bargaining as an essential interpersonal interaction casts doubt on the 
idea that the criminal adversarial system enshrines the hallmarks of a just, 
neutral process, rooted firmly in the rule of law.  In the civil context, though, 
worries are sometimes less acute:  liberty is not at stake, the power 
differential may be less dramatic between the parties, and the private ordering 
 
*  Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law; Visiting Professor of Law, 
Harvard Law School, fall 2016.  Thanks to Susan Appleton, Deborah Dinner, Matt Bodie, and 
participants in Fordham University School of Law’s colloquium entitled Civil Litigation 
Ethics at a Time of Vanishing Trials, particularly Judith Resnik and Bruce Green, for helpful 
commentary and suggestions.  For an overview of the colloquium, see Judith Resnik, Lawyers’ 
Ethics Beyond the Vanishing Trial:  Unrepresented Claimants, De Facto Aggregations, 
Arbitration Mandates, and Privatized Processes, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899 (2017). 
 
 1. See generally Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial:  An Examination of Trials and 
Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004); 
Benjamin Weiser, Trial by Jury, a Hallowed American Right, Is Vanishing, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/08/nyregion/jury-trials-vanish-and-justice-is-
served-behind-closed-doors.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/SGE6-MV2L]. 
 2. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) (arguing 
against the “highly problematic” use of settlement to resolve most legal cases). 
 3. See, e.g., Frank E.A. Sander, Address at the National Conference on the Causes of 
Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (Apr. 7–9, 1976), reprinted in 
Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 79, 111 (1976). See generally Gladys Kessler & 
Linda J. Finkelstein, The Evolution of a Multi-Door Courthouse, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 577 
(1988). 
 4. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 
1980–91 (1992) (discussing structural concerns in the plea bargaining context). 
 5. See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Getting to “Guilty”:  Plea Bargaining as 
Negotiation, 2 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115, 147–48 (1997). 
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at issue in these cases has been subject to a “market” type of analysis.6  
However, the shift from a system of public, adversarial, and ordered civil 
dispute resolution to a set of private, negotiated, and ad hoc resolutions has 
raised serious concerns about our enforcement of the laws and our 
understanding of legal outcomes. 
The disappearance of adjudicated civil disputes shines a keen light on what 
we—as a society, as individuals, and as legal professionals—expect and want 
from so-called “private” ordering.  This Article takes as fundamental 
premises (1) that laws and regulations play a vital role in our society and (2) 
that even in a system of largely nonadjudicated justice, law and legal rules 
should remain important in guiding the resolution of disputes in situations 
where those rules would otherwise apply.7  Law and legal rules are our 
society’s expression of justice; if we want outcomes to legal disputes that at 
least comport with justice, what does the absence of trials tell us about the 
optimal nature of negotiated justice?  If justice is a key ideal for the resolution 
of legal disputes, how can lawyers best achieve outcomes that are not, at a 
minimum, at odds with the law?  If we are negotiating, as I have argued in 
prior work, in the “shadow of legal process,”8 what are the implications for 
the appropriate behavior of lawyers in an adversary system? 
One key component of fairness and legitimacy for our legal system is 
procedural justice—the fairness of the process used to reach an outcome.  
Almost a half century of robust empirical research has clearly established the 
importance of procedural justice in how people assess the legitimacy of the 
legal system, leading to important judgments about adherence to decisions as 
 
 6. For analysis using a market-based approach, see generally Maurits Barendrecht & 
Berend R. de Vries, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss with Sticky Defaults:  Failure in the Market 
for Dispute Resolution Services?, 7 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 83 (2005); Frank E.A. 
Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss:  A User-Friendly Guide to 
Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOT. J. 49 (1994); Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute 
Resolution:  An Economic Analysis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1995). But see Fiss, supra note 2, at 
1075 (“Settlement is for me the civil analogue of plea bargaining:  Consent is often coerced; 
the bargain may be struck by someone without authority; the absence of a trial and judgment 
renders subsequent judicial involvement troublesome; and although dockets are trimmed, 
justice may not be done.  Like plea bargaining, settlement is a capitulation to the conditions 
of mass society and should be neither encouraged nor praised.”). 
 7. By this, I certainly mean to exclude a category of “nonlegal” disputes—those for 
which law typically provides no basis for resolution.  For example, I do not include an ordinary 
dispute between company executives as to whether they should introduce a new product into 
the market or a basic dispute between a couple as to whether or not to have children.  But as 
the creative reader can imagine, of course, even these situations could, in unique 
circumstances, theoretically lead to a resolution governed by law. See, e.g., Coke-Flavor Suit 
Rejected, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 1985), http://www.nytimes.com/1985/06/21/us/coke-flavor-
suit-rejected.html (discussing dismissal of a lawsuit seeking to force Coca-Cola to return “New 
Coke” to Coke’s original formula) [https://perma.cc/JG8D-HG6K]; Gina Vivinetto, ‘Modern 
Family’ Star Sofia Vergara Sued by Her Own Frozen Embryos, TODAY (Dec. 8, 2016), 
http://www.today.com/health/sofia-vergara-sued-her-own-frozen-embryos-t105728 
(discussing a lawsuit brought purportedly by her own embryos, backed by her former fiancé, 
for deprivation of property due to not being born) [https://perma.cc/T9SN-PLSZ]. 
 8. Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Just Negotiation, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 381, 384–85 
(2010) (noting that “individuals are bargaining in the shadow of this fair process—in the 
shadow, in essence, of due process—with the fairness of the process playing a critical role in 
individuals’ experiences in legal dispute resolution negotiation”). 
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well as compliance with laws and rules.9  Although this research has mainly 
been conducted in areas involving either a third-party decision maker10 or a 
government actor,11 research has expanded in the last several decades to 
include more nontraditional settings such as the family,12 the market,13 and, 
most importantly here, legal negotiation in a civil dispute setting.14 
Perceptions of procedural justice serve as important determinants of 
people’s satisfaction with their experience in the justice system.  In the 
courtroom, understanding what kind of process is fair is facilitated by a set 
of clear norms and rules that govern behavior.  Judges oversee a formalized 
process, parties sit in designated spaces, and the courtroom itself offers cues 
about the role of the rule of law.15  Yet, as fewer cases come to resolution 
through a judgment by a judge or a jury, the norms and rules of the courtroom 
are less reliable and available as an indicator of what process is fair or what 
benchmark by which to gauge fairness.  When parties resolve their disputes 
through negotiation—in the shadow of the adversarial process but not 
directly within the adversary system—it is much harder to understand what 
process will leave participants with the perception of procedural justice.  
Shifting the burden of fair process from a neutral third party such as a judge 
or arbitrator onto lawyers creates an ethical challenge for attorneys.  Should 
lawyers be responsible for creating a fair process for negotiating parties?  
 
 9. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 161–62 (1990). 
 10. See generally Jonathan D. Casper et al., Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22 LAW 
& SOC’Y REV. 483 (1988); E. Allan Lind et al., Individual and Corporate Dispute Resolution:  
Using Procedural Fairness as a Decision Heuristic, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 224, 235–36 (1993); 
Jennie J. Long, Compliance in Small Claims Court:  Exploring the Factors Associated with 
Defendants’ Level of Compliance with Mediated and Adjudicated Outcomes, 21 CONFLICT 
RESOL. Q. 139 (2003); Robert J. MacCoun & Tom R. Tyler, The Basis of Citizens’ Perceptions 
of the Criminal Jury, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333 (1988); Dean G. Pruitt et al., Long-Term 
Success in Mediation, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 313, 327 (1993). 
 11. See generally Aziz Z. Huq, Tom R. Tyler & Stephen J. Schulhofer, Why Does the 
Public Cooperate with Law Enforcement?:  The Influence of the Purposes and Targets of 
Policing, 17 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 419 (2011); Steven J. Schulhofer, Tom R. Tyler & 
Aziz Z. Huq, American Policing at a Crossroads:  Unsustainable Policies and the Procedural 
Justice Alternative, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 335 (2011); Jason Sunshine & Tom R. 
Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing, 
37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513 (2003); Tom R. Tyler, Enhancing Police Legitimacy, 593 ANNALS 
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 84 (2004); Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and 
Cooperation:  Why Do People Help the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 231 (2008); Tom R. Tyler & Cheryl J. Wakslak, Profiling and Police 
Legitimacy:  Procedural Justice, Attributions of Motive, and Acceptance of Police Authority, 
42 CRIMINOLOGY 253 (2004). 
 12. See generally Mark R. Fondacaro, Michael E. Dunkle & Maithilee K. Pathak, 
Procedural Justice in Resolving Family Disputes:  A Psychosocial Analysis of Individual and 
Family Functioning in Late Adolescence, 27 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 101 (1998). 
 13. See generally Harris Sondak & Tom R. Tyler, How Does Procedural Justice Shape 
the Desirability of Markets?, 28 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 79 (2007). 
 14. See, e.g., Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice in 
Negotiation:  Procedural Fairness, Outcome Acceptance, and Integrative Potential, 33 LAW 
& SOC. INQUIRY 473, 478–79 (2008). 
 15. See, e.g., Oscar G. Chase & Jonathan Thong, Judging Judges:  The Effect of 
Courtroom Ceremony on Participant Evaluation of Process Fairness-Related Factors, 24 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 221, 223–25 (2012) (discussing the “ceremonial” aspects of an American 
courtroom). 
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And, if so, how can they provide a fair process in negotiated settlement while 
retaining their role as zealous advocates in an adversary system? 
Part I of this Article provides background on procedural justice and its 
relationship to negotiation.  Part II then discusses the results of a recent 
empirical study that I conducted on the factors that help shape perceptions of 
procedural justice in the negotiation setting.  Lastly, Part III explores the 
strategic and ethical implications of these results for the practicing lawyer in 
settlement negotiations. 
I.  PROCEDURAL JUSTICE AND NEGOTIATION 
As noted above, research on the role of procedural justice in shaping 
reaction and adherence to decision-making processes is robust.  The research 
demonstrates that people’s views about their outcomes are shaped not solely 
by how fair or favorable an outcome appears to be but also by the fairness of 
the process through which the decision was reached.16  A fair process 
provided by a third party leads to higher perceptions of legitimacy;17 in turn, 
legitimacy leads to increased compliance with the law.18  Procedural justice 
effects are important across legal and nonlegal settings.  Several competing 
theories provide potential explanations of the reason for procedural justice’s 
importance:  some believe that fair process is valued because it is likely to 
lead to an accurate, fair outcome (the instrumental theory);19 others believe 
that fair process sends a signal about one’s value and worth with respect to 
the broader societal group (the group engagement theory);20 and yet others 
believe that fair process provides a mental “heuristic,” or shortcut, to assess 
one’s outcome when other benchmarks are unavailable (the fairness heuristic 
theory).21 
Despite the lack of a neutral third-party decision maker, research has 
suggested that procedural justice matters to people in the negotiation 
setting.22  Even when individuals negotiate in a one-on-one context, 
procedural justice plays a significant role in shaping reactions to the 
negotiation outcome.23  Additionally, research has suggested that even in the 
 
 16. See generally Casper et al., supra note 10; MacCoun & Tyler, supra note 10. 
 17. See TYLER, supra note 9, at 162. 
 18. See id. 
 19. See generally JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE:  A 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975). 
 20. See generally Tom R. Tyler & E. Allen Lind, A Relational Model of Authority in 
Groups, 25 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 115 (1992). 
 21. See generally Kees van den Bos et al., How Do I Judge My Outcome When I Do Not 
Know the Outcome of Others?:  The Psychology of the Fair Process Effect, 72 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 1034 (1997). 
 22. See generally Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, supra note 14, at 477–79; Edward Kass, 
Interactional Justice, Negotiator Outcome Satisfaction, and Desire for Future Negotiations:  
R-E-S-P-E-C-T at the Negotiating Table, 19 INT’L J. CONFLICT MGMT. 319 (2008); E. Allen 
Lind, Tom R. Tyler & Yuen J. Huo, Procedural Context and Culture:  Variation in the 
Antecedents of Procedural Justice Judgments, 73 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 767 
(1997). 
 23. See Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, supra note 14, at 491 (finding that procedural justice 
plays a significant role in bilateral negotiations). 
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context of dispute resolution via negotiation in the civil legal context, 
individuals still care about the fairness of process.24  Specifically, the more 
fair negotiators perceive the negotiation process to be, the more likely they 
are to believe that the agreement will be followed.25  Participants playing the 
role of lawyers in one study were more likely to recommend a negotiated 
outcome to their clients, and to believe that the agreement formed the basis 
for a good, long-term solution, when the process was characterized as fair.26 
Because research suggests that procedural fairness in negotiation plays a 
significant role in shaping potential attorney reaction to the outcome of a 
negotiation, the creation of a fair negotiation process by a lawyer is a critical 
piece of the negotiation “toolkit.”  Creating the perception of a fair process 
for the opposing counsel and party is useful if it will increase the likelihood 
of a recommendation of, and subsequent adherence to, a negotiated outcome.  
This raises the question, considered below, of what constitutes fair process in 
the negotiation setting.  Research has focused previously on how individuals 
make assessments about what a fair process is, but most of that research 
occurred in the context of a third-party decision maker.27  The following part 
considers the antecedent factors for judgments of fair process in the 
negotiation setting. 
II.  PROCEDURAL JUSTICE ANTECEDENTS IN NEGOTIATION 
Decades of research have established that four major factors are at the heart 
of assessments of procedural justice:  the opportunity to be heard; courteous 
and respectful treatment; trust in the motives of the decision maker; and the 
understanding that a neutral, unbiased rule of decision will be used.28  
Individuals value having a voice in the process, perhaps because they believe 
that sharing their side of a story will be important in ensuring a fair decision 
and perhaps because it demonstrates that the decision maker values their 
contribution.29  Individuals care about being treated with courtesy and respect 
because it provides them with dignity.30  Trust and neutrality are sometimes 
conflated and do have some conceptual overlap, but they can be distinguished 
by intent:  trust relates to the parties’ belief that a decision maker is motivated 
by the desire to be fair and accurate, while neutrality means that there is no 
bias (explicit or implicit) present and that a neutral rule is being used to 
determine the outcome of the conflict.31 
 
 24. See generally Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 8 (discussing research showing that 
whether a negotiation is conducted fairly has an effect on how negotiation outcomes are 
perceived). 
 25. See id. at 384; Pruitt et al., supra note 10, at 327. 
 26. See Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, supra note 14, at 491. 
 27. See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 8, at 384; Lind, Tyler & Huo, supra note 22, at 
768. 
 28. Tom Tyler & Steven L. Blader, Justice and Negotiation, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
NEGOTIATION AND CULTURE 295, 300 (Michele J. Gelfand & Jeanne M. Brett eds., 2004). 
 29. See id. 
 30. See id. at 301. 
 31. See id. at 300–01. 
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Yet these antecedents may not map perfectly on to the negotiation context, 
where no third-party adjudicator is present.  On one hand, when two (or 
more)32 lawyers are interacting, one can listen to the other and provide an 
opportunity to be heard, and be courteous and respectful in that interaction as 
well.  On the other hand, when partisan advocates attempt to resolve a 
conflict, it would be the rare attorney who expects neutrality from the other 
party.  Attorneys are consistently biased in favor of their own clients,33 and 
our adversarial system of zealous advocacy not only expects that bias but 
typically demands it.34  Similarly, trust in the motives of the other party 
seems less important here in the classic sense of expectations regarding the 
motive to reach the right outcome; lawyers may disagree strongly about the 
right outcome, largely based on the starting point of their own client.  In this 
context, trust in the behavior of the attorney may be more relevant—is the 
attorney speaking truthfully (or at least, not violating professional rules of 
ethics for misleading statements),35 and can the other lawyer trust that an 
agreement will likely be followed through on in the future? 
In many other contexts in which procedural justice has been studied, 
deviation from a set of procedural rules may provide an easy way for 
participants to evaluate their voice, respectful treatment, neutrality, and trust 
by offering a benchmark for appropriate treatment.  But rules in negotiation 
are few and far between.  The Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide 
that lawyers should not make misleading statements of material fact in 
communication with another lawyer (including during negotiation),36 but 
attorneys can disagree about what constitutes a “misleading” statement and 
what facts are “material.”37  The Comment to Rule 4.1 provides even less 
clarity by adding the following explanation as to what constitutes a 
“statement of fact”:  “Under generally accepted conventions in negotiation, 
certain types of statements ordinarily are not taken as statements of material 
fact.  Estimates of price or value placed on the subject of a transaction and a 
party’s intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a claim are ordinarily in 
this category.”38  Beyond these so-called rules, requirements for negotiation 
behavior are few and far between.39 
 
 32. For ease of discussion, I will refer to a dyadic negotiation between two lawyers 
throughout this Article, but I do not mean to exclude negotiations in which more than two 
parties are present from the scope of this Article. 
 33. See, e.g., Jane Goodman-Delahunty et al., Insightful or Wishful:  Lawyers’ Ability to 
Predict Case Outcomes, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 133, 135 (2010). 
 34. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).  The 
requirement of “zealous” advocacy has not been unanimously embraced. See, e.g., Paul C. 
Saunders, Whatever Happened to ‘Zealous Advocacy’?, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 11, 2011, at 4 
(discussing changes to the New York Rules of Professional Conduct that drop the language of 
“zeal”). 
 35. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.1. 
 36. See id. r. 4.1 cmt. 2; see also Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 8, at 403. 
 37. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.1 cmt. 2. 
 38. Id. 
 39. For example, a party cannot use threats or duress. See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 
8, at 402. 
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In light of the lack of clear rules for behavior provided by law or codes of 
professional conduct, questions abound regarding what the appropriate 
behavior for attorneys in a negotiation setting looks like with respect to 
fairness perceptions.  In a recent study, I explored the question of what factors 
lead to perceptions of fair process in this largely rule-free setting, empirically 
testing the origins of procedural justice judgments in legal negotiation.40  The 
study considered procedural justice in negotiation by surveying and coding 
behavior of law students playing the role of attorneys in a negotiation over a 
contract dispute.41  The students negotiated during a forty-five minute period, 
after they had both met with a “client” and researched the relevant legal 
doctrine to form an opinion about what might happen if negotiation was 
unsuccessful and the case proceeded, in this instance, to a hypothetical 
arbitration.42 
The study looked at perceptions of fairness in several ways.  First, 
individual participants in the role of attorney in a settlement negotiation were 
asked about the presence of a variety of behaviors related to procedural 
justice during the negotiation, as exhibited by themselves and by the other 
party, including voice, respect, neutrality, and trustworthiness.43  Participants 
were also asked to rate fairness globally.44  In addition, third-party coders 
watched videotapes of the negotiations and coded for specific behaviors that 
might be linked to particular procedural justice antecedent factors, such as 
interrupting (voice), contentious behavior (courtesy and respect), 
intentionally untruthful statements and unforced disclosure of potentially 
damaging information (trust), and the use of objective benchmarks such as 
legal cases, legal doctrine, industry standards, and potential arbitration 
outcomes (neutrality).45 
The results of this study suggested that all four of the variables that were 
explored played a significant role in forming assessments of fairness in 
negotiation when looking solely at individuals’ own assessments of the 
behavior in the negotiation.46  However, there were some differences in the 
relationship between procedural justice and how individuals assessed 
themselves versus others.47  For example, one’s own courtesy and respect 
behavior and the other party’s courtesy and respect behavior mattered to an 
individual’s perceptions of procedural justice, but regression analysis 
suggested that one’s own personal behavior in treating someone else 
courteously and respectfully was a more significant driver than one’s 
courteous and respectful treatment by the other party.48  Voice effects in both 
 
 40. See generally Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Formation of Procedural Justice 
Judgments in Legal Negotiation, 26 GROUP DECISION & NEGOT. 19 (2016). 
 41. See id. at 24. 
 42. See id. at 24–25, 40. 
 43. See id. at 25. 
 44. See id. 
 45. See id. at 26–29. 
 46. See id. at 35. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See id. at 35–36. 
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directions were also important in shaping perceptions of fair process.49  With 
respect to trust, unsurprisingly, individuals’ perceptions about the other 
party’s trustworthiness were significantly related to assessments of fair 
process, but individuals’ assessments of their own trustworthiness were less 
important.50  Neutrality correlated with procedural justice judgments on its 
own, but in regression analysis with other factors, its importance 
diminished.51  In sum, the study results suggest that courtesy and voice are 
the most important factors in a person’s judgments about fair process in 
negotiation but that trust, and to a lesser degree, neutrality, also play a role.52  
Taken as a whole, the results suggest that interpersonal relational factors may 
be more significant than more structural behavior in terms of influencing 
perceptions of fairness.53 
These results suggest that negotiators who want to create perceptions of 
procedural justice in negotiation would be well served to focus most 
explicitly on treating their counterparts with courtesy and providing them 
voice, with a meaningful but ancillary effort to act in a trustworthy manner 
and to appear neutral.  But interesting findings that may relate to neutrality’s 
role in negotiation demand further discussion.  In particular, thinking about 
neutrality in negotiation, one might imagine that resorting to discussions 
regarding what might happen if an agreement is not reached could provide 
some neutral benchmark for discussion and that such a discussion might 
promote procedural justice perceptions.  Similarly, discussion of legal 
doctrine, industry rules and standards, or specific language from the contract 
that was the subject matter of the dispute, might provide indicia of neutrality 
that in turn could lead to increased perceptions of procedural justice. 
In contrast, though, discussion of potential outcomes in a third-party 
dispute resolution process (in this study, as noted above, that process was 
arbitration)54 was significantly and negatively correlated with assessments of 
procedural justice, meaning that when parties discussed the potential 
outcome in arbitration during the negotiation, they found the negotiation 
process less fair.55  Similarly, discussing the main legal doctrine relevant to 
the breach of contract case, substantial performance had a negative effect on 
one’s own, but not the other party’s, perceptions of fair process.56  That is, 
when a negotiator talked about substantial performance, her own perception 
of the fairness of the negotiation process declined.  Discussing industry 
standards and specific contract language between the parties had no effect on 
 
 49. See id. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See id. at 36. 
 52. See id. 
 53. See id. 
 54. For the purposes of this Article, I would argue that the significant differences in 
arbitration and litigation are less likely to play a role in changing the effects of procedural 
justice in the settlement negotiation, although that is certainly a question that merits empirical 
inquiry. 
 55. See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 40, at 39–40. 
 56. See id. at 36–37 (noting that perceptions of procedural justice are influenced by one’s 
perception of his or her own behavior). 
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assessments of fairness; industry standard discussions, though, were 
significantly and negatively related to negotiators’ assessments of the 
neutrality of the negotiation as a whole.57 
Before proceeding to a discussion about the implications of this research, 
a caveat is necessary.  Importantly, there is not yet any empirical research on 
the relationship between the procedural justice perceived by the lawyer and 
the procedural justice perceived by the client; indeed, almost all procedural 
justice research in the legal setting has asked the principals, not the agents, 
about their perceptions of fair process.  Additionally, the empirical research 
that has considered lawyers has not considered the relationship between the 
procedural justice perspectives of lawyers and those of clients.  Given that 
much of negotiation takes place without clients present,58 it is important to 
understand that connection in a more nuanced way.  Do lawyers have the 
capacity to “check” fair process at the door and only report to their clients on 
the ways in which an outcome is or is not fair or favorable?  Or is there a 
“pass-through” effect of fair process?  The research highlighted above 
suggests the latter, given that lawyers appear to be more enthusiastic about 
recommending a settlement when they believe that the negotiation process 
has been fair.59  When lawyers are more enthusiastic about a settlement, 
presumably they pass along this enthusiasm to the client, and there is likely 
to be a higher rate of acceptance of a negotiated settlement.60  Although this 
effect has not yet been empirically tested, this Article proceeds on the 
assumption that fair process for a lawyer will have a “transitive” effect on the 
acceptance by the client so that higher procedural justice experienced by the 
lawyer will translate to higher procedural justice for the client.61  Indeed, this 
is why the ethics of the lawyer vis-à-vis procedural justice in negotiation are 
particularly important.  In the next part, I discuss the implications of this 
research on lawyers’ perception of fair process for negotiation behavior. 
III.  IMPLICATIONS 
Procedural justice may be an important consideration in negotiation for a 
variety of reasons.  First, a lawyer may want to use procedural justice as part 
of her negotiation “tool kit,” knowing that such treatment may be likely to 
lead to greater adherence to and acceptance of an agreement.  And beyond 
the instrumental value of procedural justice, there is intrinsic value to 
individuals in having a fair process in negotiation, as suggested by the group 
 
 57. See id. at 31. 
 58. Recent research by Donna Shestowsky suggests that client satisfaction might increase 
if clients were present during negotiation; participants in a field study consistently ranked 
negotiating with clients present as one of the most appealing ways for a dispute to be resolved. 
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Procedures Ex Ante, 99 IOWA L. REV. 637, 673–74 (2014). 
 59. See Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, supra note 14, at 484. 
 60. See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 8, at 426–27. 
 61. If procedural justice experienced by lawyers is, in fact, a “dead end,” then this 
discussion is less relevant and the focus should shift to the procedural justice experienced by 
the client in the interaction with her attorney.  It seems doubtful that any client would care, 
independently, about the fair process experienced by her hired agent simply on its own terms. 
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engagement model of procedural justice.62  There is also broader societal gain 
because processes that are perceived as procedurally fair are also likely to 
increase perceptions of legitimacy of the legal system.63  This potential effect 
on perceptions of legitimacy is of particular importance in a system of 
negotiated justice, where reliance on individual adherence to outcomes, 
rather than judicial oversight of outcomes, is especially relevant.  These 
concerns all suggest the added value of a procedural justice approach to 
negotiation. 
At the same time, however, substantive law matters.  In their seminal and 
deeply influential work on bargaining in the shadow of the law, Robert 
Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser argued that there was a strong role for 
substantive legal rules in negotiation over family law outcomes; essentially, 
individuals bargain in the shadow of legal endowments rather than with a 
blank slate of potential choices.64  And Roger Fisher and William Ury argued 
forcefully in their book, Getting to YES, that reference to objective criteria—
using some kind of external benchmark as indicia of legitimacy—is a key 
way to do well in negotiation.65  Similarly, Fisher and Ury recommend the 
strategic invocation of the “best alternative to a negotiated agreement”—the 
BATNA.66  A BATNA is what will happen if a negotiated agreement is not 
reached; in the case of a dispute for which there is an underlying legal basis 
for resolution, the BATNA is typically what will happen in court or at 
arbitration. 
Thus, leading scholars have convincingly argued that substantive legal 
endowments, and what an adjudicator is likely to do if negotiation processes 
break down, are critical guideposts in negotiation practice.  Additionally, 
negotiation scholarship and teaching have widely supported and adopted this 
viewpoint as negotiation “gospel.”67  But scholars have not previously 
considered the effects of resorting to a discussion of legal endowments, 
objective criteria, and BATNAs on procedural justice perceptions.  My own 
study indicated that inclusion of such “neutral” legal indicators in a 
negotiation process had a significant, negative effect.68  When parties in a 
negotiation refer to the potential arbitration outcomes that might result if 
negotiation is not successful, both parties’ perceptions of fair process fall.69  
And when one party discusses the legal doctrine, her own perception of 
fairness falls.70  My research, demonstrating the potential negative effect of 
 
 62. See Tyler & Lind, supra note 20, at 139–40. 
 63. See TYLER, supra note 9, at 162. 
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 68. See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 40, at 39. 
 69. See id. at 39–40. 
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“law” on negotiation process fairness, thus suggests a thought-provoking 
puzzle in regard to the procedural justice issue for lawyers.71 
My empirical results are unable to speak to the underlying reasons why 
invocation of legal norms negatively affects procedural justice perceptions.  
It seems plausible that negotiators who are most focused on what will happen 
in an adjudicated process are more likely to discuss that process.  In that case, 
are those negotiators less effective in some way because of their 
preoccupation with that other process?  Are they signaling a lack of 
commitment to the negotiation process that undermines perceptions of 
fairness by both parties?  Does a negotiator’s own focus on legal doctrine 
lead her to measure the fairness of a negotiation process against the norms of 
an (imagined) adjudicative “fair process” and leave negotiation to come up 
short in (imagined) comparison? 
Regardless of the underlying mechanism for the result, if law matters, and 
yet lawyers’ invocation of the likely adjudicated outcome during a 
negotiation may lead parties to conclude that a negotiation is less fair, what 
can lawyers do to overcome this paradox?  I have long taught my negotiation 
students that an understanding of legal endowments is critical but that an 
extensive legal argument during a negotiation may be a waste of time, if not 
counterproductive.  I explain that in our adversary system, it is highly 
unlikely that after such an exposition of the law—even a sound and 
persuasive one—the other party to the negotiation will say, simply, “That’s 
right—you win.”  The nature of the adversarial system is that both parties 
will compete and there will be an outcome determined by a third-party 
neutral—highlighted perfectly by Justice Roberts’s famous “ball-and-
strikes” judge-as-umpire metaphor.72  And this neutral third party is simply 
not present in a settlement negotiation.  Both parties in a negotiation must 
agree for a settlement to occur.  This means that effective negotiation 
behavior cannot center around legal argument in the same way that 
courtroom advocacy does; persuasive negotiation behavior must differ from 
the adversarial legal argument. 
Legal disputes concern the rights and responsibilities of parties under a 
rule of law, and the lack of a neutral third party during negotiation should not 
be an invitation to jettison the importance of the law.  The importance of legal 
rules may be even more significant in negotiations with considerable power 
and resource differentials.  And yet a settlement negotiation typically 
represents a private ordering, without resort to an adjudicative outcome, that 
occurs for a variety of reasons that are outside the scope of this Article but 
presumably does provide some set of benefits to the parties.  If parties are 
going to negotiate, and most of these negotiations will end the dispute, the 
balance between the need for the law to play a role and the extrajudicial 
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nature of the process is paramount.  We may rely on attorneys to “police” the 
boundaries of legal settlement to ensure that legal endowments are respected 
or, at least, traded off for other benefits.73  And yet, in addition to distributive 
justice, people deeply care about the fairness of process, including in a 
negotiation setting.74  Research on procedural justice suggests that 
individuals are expecting—or, at the least, find beneficial—a fair process that 
shadows the fair process they might get in an adjudicative setting.75  But 
using legal endowments in a negotiation may promote the use of legal 
standards at the expense of providing a procedurally just process. 
So what should an ethical lawyer do in light of this conundrum?  Should 
lawyers resort to legal argument about what an adjudicative body might do 
in order to ensure that legal norms are not overlooked or ignored, despite the 
risk of negatively affecting the procedural justice of the negotiation?  Or 
should they ignore legal arguments about the likely outcome in negotiation 
to demonstrate a commitment to the negotiation proceeding and avoid 
building mistrust that negatively affects procedural justice perceptions and, 
perhaps, ultimate adherence to the agreement? 
Each option has considerable drawbacks.  Ignoring the legal framework 
has both strategic and ethical implications.  Leaving the potential adjudicated 
outcome out of the negotiation discussion eliminates an important 
negotiation tool—resorting to BATNA—that can help to ensure that an 
outcome falls within parameters set by law.  The idea behind a BATNA is 
that no one should agree to any negotiated outcome that is not at least as good 
as or better than what he or she might receive if no agreement is reached.76  
That is to say, in a legal case, the Getting to YES paradigm advises that a 
negotiator should understand what the likely outcome at trial would be and 
should never settle for less than what that outcome would provide to the 
client.  This is a way for negotiators to ensure that distributive justice is 
respected in a world outside of third-party adjudication. 
Potential outcomes and legal standards can also serve as the “objective 
criteria” recommended by Getting to YES to help negotiate a favorable and 
fair outcome.77  Getting to YES advises that objective criteria can shift the 
negotiation discussion from a battle of wills to a battle of norms and, ideally, 
shape the negotiation outcome against a backdrop of standards that can 
provide legitimacy.78  Such objective criteria can include scientific standards, 
industry norms, and, in legal cases, legal precedent.79  These criteria can be 
very helpful in persuading opposing negotiators of the reasonable basis for 
one’s demands.  And, similar to BATNA, the use of objective criteria can 
help ensure that a negotiated outcome fits within a range of distributively just 
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outcomes.80  Yet, if their use is not conducive to a fair process, a lawyer may 
lose as much as she gains by bringing up objective criteria.81 
One potential solution is to think expressly about the two negotiations all 
lawyers deal with—one with a client, the other with opposing counsel—as 
distinct enterprises for the purpose of using objective criteria and external 
benchmarking regarding a potential adjudicated outcome.  Explicit 
discussion with one’s own client regarding the external benchmarks by which 
to measure the negotiated outcome may be very important and may be less 
likely to cause a client to believe that the process of negotiation with the 
lawyer is procedurally unjust.  This is, in part, because the kind of neutrality 
sought by a client may differ from the kind of neutrality that opposing counsel 
might seek.  Once these benchmarks are developed and discussed with a 
client, there may be less need to resort to them expressly during the 
negotiation, at least in terms of what might be lost by failing to discuss them 
with opposing counsel.  That is, as long as a lawyer has those benchmarks in 
mind implicitly during the negotiation, that may serve the goals of both not 
ignoring potential outcomes and not derailing the fairness of process of the 
negotiation. 
Another solution—one that more clearly addresses the potential gap 
between a lawyer’s procedural justice experiences in the negotiation and the 
client’s experiences—could involve the judge’s case management powers 
under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.82  Under Rule 16, a 
judge could mandate that clients attend negotiations,83 which would first 
have the effect of making procedural justice concerns more directly 
connected to clients’ experience in negotiation rather than potentially “lost” 
on their attorneys or perceived secondhand.  Additionally, an explicitly 
judge-managed settlement conference, in which the judge discusses doctrine 
or precedent, might provide better indicia of neutrality for the purposes of 
procedural justice judgments for both clients and lawyers alike, as opposed 
to the behavior of an opposing counsel.  This would allow a role for 
discussion of the law without its potential negative effects on procedural 
justice in negotiation. 
Of course, involving the judge in this way also has drawbacks.  If a judge 
mandated that parties attend negotiation, there could be enforcement 
problems if one party refused to comply.  Additionally, attorneys might 
bemoan the lack of flexibility, not to mention constraint on negotiation tactics 
that would arise from a requirement of client presence.84  And a judge-
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managed settlement, of course, would add a significant layer of cost, time, 
and formality to negotiation. 
Because the effect of courtesy and respect on procedural justice is stronger 
than the effect of a discussion of the likely outcome, it may be that more 
research on procedural justice antecedent behavior could shed light on 
whether an emphasis on the other procedural justice antecedents might 
mitigate any potential negative effects of resorting to discussion of the likely 
adjudicated outcome.  Also, my research suggests that the discussion of a 
legal case or precedent may have less effect on procedural justice than 
reference to a specific legal doctrine and that reference to an industry 
standard is less impactful than discussion of what will happen at arbitration.85  
What may account for this difference, although it is subtle, is that perhaps 
discussion of past legal cases may be more open to reasonably differing 
interpretation, but discussion and prediction of future decisions appears more 
partisan and extreme.86  Additionally, lawyers may differ significantly in how 
they use legal doctrine in negotiation—while legal “argument” may be 
counterproductive both in fostering procedural justice and in effectiveness, 
perhaps there are other ways to deploy legal rules and principles in a more 
persuasive and less adversarial manner. 
Another important caveat to this discussion is that legal negotiations differ 
significantly by type and nature.  The research discussed above took place in 
the context of a fairly straightforward contract dispute between two relatively 
power-equivalent parties.  In negotiations that involve more substantive 
personal or civil rights, power differentials between the parties, or other 
factors that may change the nature of the dispute, the role of using legal 
doctrine and potential adjudicative outcome may be quite different.  
Negotiations in cases that concern important potential legal precedent may 
also be uniquely situated with regard to procedural justice concerns.  
Similarly, multiparty negotiations and negotiations that involve the 
government may also be so distinct as to call for particular analysis. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the empirical research I have described above is subject to 
limitations, it suggests the importance of thinking extremely carefully about 
the use of legal precedent and legal prediction in legal negotiation.  While 
such factors are the bread and butter of practicing attorneys in the midst of 
an adjudication, their use in negotiation may have unexpected and unplanned 
effects.  Lawyers must take extra care to navigate the potential consequences 
of using legal rules if they also want to reap the benefits of procedural justice 
effects in their negotiation.  Certainly, it seems as though it would be a 
tremendous dereliction of a lawyer’s duty of zealous advocacy to fail to 
adequately use the law as a safety net to ensure that a negotiated outcome is 
not dramatically short of what the law might provide, even taking into 
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account differences in perception regarding the likely outcome in a court.  
But sensitivity to the impact that using the law and legal doctrine 
adversarially in a negotiation may have on procedural justice is warranted.  
There are psychological, systemic, and strategic reasons that lawyers should 
care about perceptions of procedural justice in negotiation.  But procedural 
justice concerns must be balanced against the need to ensure that even when 
the potential “umpire” in our adversary system is sitting on the sidelines, we 
still find a way to respect the law and legal rules. 
 
